Human Factors of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems: Lessons from Incident Reports by Null, Cynthia & Hobbs, Alan
Human Factors of Remotely Piloted Aircraft 
Systems: Lessons from Incident Reports 
Alan Hobbs* &  Cynthia Null** 
* San Jose State University/NASA Ames Research Center 
** NASA Langley Research Center 
 
 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20160013322 2019-08-29T17:25:32+00:00Z
Agenda 
• Human challenges of remote piloting 
• Problem: Lack of available incident data 
• Critical incident technique 
• Preliminary results: under-examined issues 
• Conclusions 
 
 
2 
Human Challenges of Remote 
Piloting 
• Loss of natural sensing 
– Situational awareness & collision avoidance 
• Control and communication via radio link 
• Physical characteristics of control station 
• In-flight transfer of control  
• Reliance on automation  
• Flight termination   
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Responsibilities of the RPAS pilot 
4 
Control stations 
5 
Flight termination contingency planning 
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Over 280 emergency landing sites were identified for NASA’s Ikhana wildfire monitoring 
missions. (Buoni & Howell, 2008).  
Detect and Avoid 
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The Problem 
• Lack of data on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems 
(RPAS) incidents 
• Relatively few RPAS reports have been submitted 
to NASA’s ASRS by RPAS pilots 
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Critical Incident Technique 
• In 1940’s, researchers asked pilots to recall pilot 
error incidents 
– Many “errors” reflected poor cockpit design 
– Results led to standardized cockpit design in modern 
aircraft 
 
 
Major accident 1 
Minor accidents 10 
Reportable incidents 30 
Minor events 600 
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The Current Study 
• Goal: Examine the feasibility of a method to collect 
the operational experiences of RPAS pilots  
– Information will be used to identify needed 
improvements in control station design, procedures, 
training, etc    
• Will provide independent and complementary data 
to supplement NASA simulations and flight tests  
10 
Approach 
• Focus groups with 2-3 pilots at a time 
• Participants asked to recall events that they have 
experienced while operating a remotely piloted 
aircraft 
1. A hazardous situation or error 
- Could involve the design of the system, procedures, 
communication, or other issue  
2. The rectification of a hazardous situation or error 
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Approach 
• Participant identities remain confidential  
• De-identified incident reports will be made public 
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Preliminary Results 
• 23 participants 
• 90 incidents described 
• Weight classes of the remotely piloted aircraft: 
 
Aircraft max takeoff weight     # of reports 
Less than 400 lbs       17 
2000-15,000 lbs        60 
Greater than 15,000 lbs      13 
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Problems Mentioned in Reports 
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Camera view illusion
Stale lost link mission
Weather
Lack of sensory information
Checklists
Data entry errors and slips
Maps and charts
ATC
Control transfer
Mode error/automation
Controls and displays
Link management and quality
Number of Mentions 
Link issues 
1. Lost link 
– Unintentional vs intentional 
2. Multiple losses of link 
3. Voice latency 
4. Lost link timer and “lost link OK” 
– Entering areas with uncertain coverage  
– ATC certainty 
 
15 
Example Narrative: Lost link 
“We were flying really far out … about 90 kilometers 
from the antenna. But I passed some random mountain 
peak for about one second and the aircraft went into 
emergency mode. Luckily I had the correct emergency 
mode programmed. If I didn't, I could've lost the 
aircraft”. 
        
 
       < 400 lbs 
Example Narrative: Multiple lost link 
“One day the power company severed a power line. We 
lost link to all UASs … The uninterrupted power system 
(UPS) in the GCS has a maximum of 18 minutes of 
power available until the generators are up and running, 
but power ran out before the back-up generators were 
up and running”.      
        
  
       > 2000 lbs 
 
Example Narrative: Lost link timer 
“A pilot programmed “lost link okay” for a 3-hour period 
while the aircraft was loitering on satellite control. 
While he had the aircraft it actually went into lost link 
and it was still lost link when I came in to take over. I 
didn’t want to take an aircraft that I have no idea where 
it’s at or what it is doing. I did eventually take over the 
aircraft and another GCS, who had line-of-sight control, 
finally took over the aircraft”.  
 
       >2000 lbs 
Example Narrative: Lost Link 
“A pilot programmed ‘lost link okay’ for a 3-hour 
period of time while the aircraft was loitering and on 
satellite control. While he had the aircraft it actually 
went into lost link and it was still lost link when I came 
in to take over. I didn’t want to take an aircraft that I 
have no idea where it’s at or what it is doing. I did 
eventually take over the aircraft and another GCS, 
who had line-of-sight control, finally took over the 
aircraft”.  
       
Controls and Displays 
• Interfaces may be particularly error-productive  
• Keyboard and consumer interfaces 
• Shared payload and flight controls 
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Nogales Predator Accident 
Nogales Predator Accident 
 
Control Transfers 
• Inter-control station mode errors 
• Unintended transfers 
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Example: Inter-control Station 
Mode Error 
“During preflight, handover checks were being done … we 
had the aircraft engine at idle with the parking brake set, 
but when the radio handover switched to XXX, he didn’t 
have the parking brake set and the power was set at 80% 
….  The result was the engine revving up, and the aircraft 
jumping its chocks”.   
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Example: Unintended Transfer 
“I was preparing to take control of the aircraft 
from the MCE. The transmitters from my GCS 
were accidently left on. When I slewed the 
directional antenna to get the picture of the 
aircraft (the down link info), this automatically 
gave me control of the aircraft. I was not 
intending to take control of the aircraft at this 
time”. 
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Example: Data Entry Errors and Slips 
26 
“I went to put the gear down, but instead I 
turned the SAS  [Stability Augmentation 
System] off using the red emergency 
button. The aircraft went into a 20-degree 
bank and 5-degrees nose down. I was able 
to recover the airplane”. I had developed 
muscle memory with the activation of the 
SAS disengagement button.  
Stale Lost Link 
• Pilot awareness of lost link mission 
• Lost link mission needs regular updating 
• Lost link mission can be a form of “automation 
surprise” 
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Example: Stale Lost Link 
“At the beginning of the flight, the lost link 
procedure was valid, but the procedure was not 
updated later in the flight. At one point, had the 
lost link procedure been activated, it would’ve 
had the aircraft fly through terrain in an attempt 
to reach the next waypoint. However, the 
aircraft didn’t lose link and the error was caught 
in the handover to the next set of operators”. 
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Example: Camera View Illusion 
“Depending on how I do the landing …. [the moveable 
sensor camera] …will be used to make sure that we 
clear the turns. But sometimes, the sensor operator 
will move the  camera, which will make it look like that 
I’m turning but I’m actually not turning. So I have to 
concentrate and make sure I don’t respond to that 
erroneous camera view”. 
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Conclusions and Next Steps 
• RPAS pilots are willing to share their experience  
• Incident reports are helping to identify under-
examined topics 
• Results will be used to inform  
– Design guidelines for RPAS control stations 
– Input to FAA & ICAO 
– Incident reporting systems 
– Research needs 
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Unanswered questions 
• What guidelines are needed for control station design? 
– Should there be an RPAS equivalent of the “Basic T” flight 
instruments?  
• Should one remote pilot manage multiple RPA?  
• What does ATC need to know about each RPA flight? 
• What is the impact of delays on pilot voice 
communications?  
• Do remote pilots need experience flying a conventional 
aircraft?  
• Flight termination decision making?  
• How much automation is too much? 
• Will conventional aircraft start to look more like RPAS? 
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